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IN THE

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
\VILLIA~I

A. FAWCETT, Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
SECURITY BENEFIT ASSOCIATION,
a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant's Brief
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY,
UTAH.
P. C. EVANS, JUDGE.

STATEMENT.

This is an action for death benefits based upon a
Benefit Certificate issued by Defendant, a fraternal
beneficiary society, to Harriett P. Fawcett February
18, 1922.
Mrs. Fawcett paid assessments each month until
September, 1928. Her Certificate provided that upon
default in payment of assessments after six years of
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membership she would be entitled to ten years and
thirty days extended insurance. Pursuant to her application an endorsement to this effect was placed upon
her Certificate, which endorsement further stated that
the Certificate would expire October 30, 1938. Mrs.
Fawcett died November 7, 1938, and after her death due
and proper Proofs of Death were made by plaintiff,
her beneficiary.
For convenience the parties will be referred to in
this Brief as they were designated in the Trial Court,
William A. Fawcett as plaintiff, and The Security Benefit Association as defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges that on February 6,
1922, Harriett P. Fawcett made application for membership in Milford Council No. 3611 of Defendant Association, and for a benefit Certificate in the sum of
$1000.00 on the American Experience Twenty Pay Plan;
that said application was approved and Defendant duly
issued Benefit Certificate No. 911864, bearing date February 14, 1922; that said Certificate was delivered to
Harriett P. Fawcett February 18, 1922, at which time
she paid $2.60, the amount of the first monthly contribution on said Certificate, plus Local Council dues;
that in addition to the first monthly payment plaintiff
paid an equivalent of $2.60 each month from :\larch,
1922, down to and including the month of September,
1928; that said Certificate provided for extended protection for a period of ten years and thirty days ; that
on January 6, 1929, Harriett P. Fawcett made applica-
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tion to Defendant for extended protection for said
period. (Abst. 1-4}
Plaintiff further alleged that the Certificate did
not become effectiYe until delivered to and signed by
the applicant during the applicant's good health; that
the first monthly payment was made on February 18,
1922, and covered a period from February 18, 1922, to
~\[arch 18, 1922; that each payment thereafter fell due
on the 18th day of each month, commencing with lVIarch
18, 192:2, and covered a period of one month from the
18th day of each month; that the last payment made
covered the period from September 18, 1928, to October 18, 1928, and that Harriett P. Fawcett was entitled
to extended insurance for a period of ten years and
thirty days from October 18, 1928, or to November 18,
1938; that she died on November 7, 1938, while the Certificate was in full force and effect. (Abst. 4-7)
Defendant in its answer admitted the issuance of
the Certificate and payment of assessments and Local
Council dues at the time and in the manner alleged by
plaintiff, but alleged that under the contract, which
consisted of the application, the Certificate and the
Constitution and Laws, the member was required to
pay one assessment and Local Council dues for the
month in which the Certificate was delivered, and thereafter to pay an assessment and Local Council dues on
or before the last day of each succeeding month; that
all assessments for each month became due and payable on the first day of the month and members who
failed to pay such assessment on or before the last day
of the month became automatically suspended.· Defendant alleged that the assessment paid February 18,
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1922, was for the month of February, 1922, the month
in which the Certificate was delivered; that the assessment for the month of March was due March 1, 1922,
but that the members were given the right to pay said
assessment on or before the last day of March; that
the last assessment paid by Harriett P. Fawcett was
for the month of September, 1928, and that she was
granted extended insurance for ten years and thirty
days from October 1, 1928; that pursuant to her application, an endorsement was made providing that she
was entitled to extended protection for ten years and
thirty days from October 1, 1928; that said endorsement further provided that the Certificate of membership expired October 30, 1938; that Harriett P. Fawcett
accepted and retained said certificate as amended, and
thereby acquiesced in, accepted and ratified the terms
of said contract as amended by said endorsement; that
said Certificate expired October 30, 1938, and was therefore void and of no force or effect on November 7, 1938,
the date of death of Harriett P. Fawcett. Defendant
further alleged that as a Kansas corporation the rights
and liabilities of all members are governed by the Laws
of Kansas, and that under the Laws of Kansas, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case
of Wolford, Adm'x. v. National Life Insurance Co.,
114 Kan. 411, 219 P. 263, the date fixed in the contract
for the payment of premiums governs, and the fact that
the policy was not delivered on a date corresponding
with the times specifically fixed for subsequent premiums does not postpone the time for such payments to
the anniversary of the date of the policy. Defendant
pleaded that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
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the United States Constitution, it was entitled to have
the Laws of l{ansas, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Kansas in said case, applied by the Courts
of Utah in determining the rights of plaintiff and of
defendant. (Abst. 7-18)
Plaintiff's reply admitted the fraternal character of
defendant, admitted the contract contained the language
alleged in defendant's answer and reaffirmed the allegations of his complaint, and prayed for judgment in
accordance with the prayer of his complaint, and prayed
for reformation of the endorsement to correspond with
the alleged intention of the parties if necessary.
This case was tried upon an agreed statement of
facts. This statement is short, so for the convenience
of the Court we will set it out in full in this Brief:
"AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS.

(Abst. 24-28. Trans. 17, 46)
It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between
the parties hereto, through their respective Attorneys
of record, that the following facts may be considered by
the Court as admitted and that no evidence thereon will
be required:
1. It is admitted that the defendant is and was at
all times herein mentioned a fraternal benefit society,
a corporation chartered, organized and operating under
and by virtue of the Laws of the State of Kansas, and
duly licensed and operating in the State of Utah as a
fraternal benefit society under and by virtue of the
Laws of the State of Utah relating to foreign fraternal
benefit societies; that the defendant is a corporation

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
without capital stock, organized and carried on solely
for the mutual benefit of its members and their beneficiaries and not for profit; that it has a lodge system
with ritualistic form of work and representative form
of government, and makes provision for the payment
of benefits in accordance with Section 43-9-6 of the
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933.
2. That on or about February 6, 1922, Harriett P.
Fawcett made written application for membership in
Milford Council No. 3611 of Defendant Association and
a Benefit Certificate in the sum of $1000 on the American Experience Twenty Pay Plan; that a true and correct copy of said application is attached hereto, marked
Exhibit "1 ", and made a part hereof as fully as though
it were set out in full herein; that said application was
duly approved by defendant, and said Association pursuant to said application duly issued Benefit Certificate
No. 911864 in the amount of $1000, bearing date February 14, 1922, a photostatic copy of which is hereto
attached, marked Exhibit "2 ", and made a part hereof
as fully as though set out in full herein; that the contract between The Security Benefit Association and
said Harriett P. Fawcett consisted of the Certificate,
Exhibit '' 2 '' hereto, the application for membership,
Exhibit "1 ", and the Constitution and Laws of Defendant Association, a true and correct copy of which
is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "3 ", and made a
part hereof.
3. That Harriett P. Fawcett was thereafter initiated and became a member of Defendant Association;
that Defendant delivered said Certificate to Harriett P.
Fawcett on February 18, 1922, during her good health;
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that on ~aid date Harriett P. Fawcett signed said Certificate and acknowledged in writing· on said Certificate the delivery of the same to her, and at such time
she paid to Defendant the sum of $2.60, which sum was
the amount of the first n1onthly contribution on said
Certificate as provided for therein, plus the amount
of Local Council dues of Defendant Association.
4. That in addition to the first monthly payment
as above set forth, Harriett P. Fawcett paid to the
Financier of the Defendant Association an equivalent
of $2.60 each month from the month of March, 1922,
down to and including the month of September, 1928,
which sum included the monthly assessment payments
on said Certificate, plus Local Council dues, the last
payment thereon having been made September 30, 1928.

5. That Harriett P. Fawcett was twenty-eight
years of age, nearest birthday, at the time of the
issuance of said Benefit Certificate; that according to
the table of values, which is a part of said Certificate,
after monthly payments were made on said Certificate
for a period of six full years, the withdrawal equity
value of said Certificate was sufficient to purchase extended insurance for ten years and thirty days; that on
January 6, 1929, Harriett P. Fawcett made written application for extended protection for said period; that
a true and correct copy of said application for extended
protection is attached hereto, marked Exhibit "4", and
made a part of this Agreed Statement of Facts.
6. T4at Harriett P. Fawcett thereupon delivered
said Benefit Certificate No. 911864, together with said
application for extended protection, to the Defendant
Association for endorsement, and thereafter and on
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January 18, 1929, pursuant to said application for extended protection, the Defendant Association placed the
following ~ndorsement on said Certificate:
"January 18, 1929.
The Security Benefit Association, upon the request of the said Harriett P. Fawcett, hereby
waives the periodical contributions stipulated in
this Certificate of Membership and continues
Whole Life Protection for death benefits only, in
the sum of $1000.00 for ten years and thirty days
from October 1, 1928, this Certificate of membership expiring October 30, 1938.
As part of the consideration for this extension
the said Harriett Fawcett agrees to surrender this
Certificate for cancellation after the expiration
thereof as above described.
THE SECURITY BENEFIT ASSN.
J. M. Kirkpatrick,
National President.
J. V. Abrahams,
(Seal)
National Secretary.''
That said Certificate as endorsed was returned to said
Harriett P. Fawcett and received and retained by her.
7. That Harriett P. Fawcett died November 7,
1938; that due notice and proof of death was filed by
Plaintiff herein within ninety days from the date of
death.
8. The parties hereto further agree that the case
of Walford, Administratrix, v. National Life Ins. Co.,
reported in 114 Kansas Reports 411, 219 Pacific Reporter 263, attached hereto, marked Exhibit "5 ", and
made a part hereof, is a true and correct copy of the
decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas, being the
highest court of said state.
9. That the plaintiff herein, prior to the death of
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the ~aid IIarriett P. Fawcett had not seen and did not
know the content~ of said benefit certificate and the
l'lldorsement thereon.
10. It is agreed that either party hereto, or the
Court may refer to or consider any portion of the contract, consisting of Exhibits ''1", "~'' and "3", which
rhey deem pertinent to the issues herein, and in the
e\ent of an appeal from the decision of the District
Court either party n1ay incorporate in the abstract of
the record any portion of said contract which they may
deem pertinent, but that it shall not be necessary to
copy the entire contract in the record on appeal."
The Trial Court in written conclusions of law,
based upon the Agreed Statement of Facts, found that
said Benefit Certificate was on November 7, 1938, the
date of the death of Harriett P. Fawcett, by virtue of
the provisions for extended insurance contained in paragraph 6 of said Certificate, in full force and effect for
death benefits only in the sum of $1000.00, and that
plaintiff was entitled to judgment against defendant
for said sum. (Abst. 30-31)
STATEMENT OF ERRORS.

The Defendant, Appellant herein, contends that the
Trial Court erred in the following particulars:
1. The court erred in finding that the stipulated
facts are sufficient to support a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendant; that said stipulated facts are insufficient to support, sustain, or
jnstify the decision, conclusions of law, and judgment
rendered by the District Court.
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2. The court erred in signing and entering the conclusions of law and judgment submitted by respondents,
and particularly in its conclusion of law that Benefit
Certificate No. 911864, dated February 14, 1922, issued
to Harriett P. Fawcett by the defendant association,
was on November 7, 1938, the date of the death of Harriett P. Fawcett, by virtue of the provision for extended
insurance contained in Paragraph VI of said certificate, in full force and effect for death benefit only, in
the sum of $1,000.00, and in rendering judgment therefor.
3. That the court erred in denying appellant's motion for a new trial.
4. That the decision rendered by the District Court
is against law.
All of the above errors involve the same questions
and will be discussed together.
QUESTIONS INVOLVED.

The principal question involved in this case is
whether the payment made February 18, 1922, paid for
insurance to March 18, 1922, or whether it paid the
assessment for the month of February, 1922, requiring
another payment to pay the assessment for the period
commencing March 1, 1922, and whether subsequent
payments were for the period commencing on the first
day of each subsequent month or for the period commencing on the 18th day of the month.
A second question involved is the effect of the
endorsement placed upon the Certificate January 18,
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l~l~9, which stated specifically
. the Certificate expired
October 30, 1938.
A third question involYed i~ whether plaintiff as
beneficiary of Harriett P. Fa·wcett is estopped to claim
rights inconsistent with the terms of the endorsement.
A fourth question involved is whether, under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Con~titution, the Laws of Kansas control the rights of all
members of Defendant Association, including the date
·when subsequent assessments become due.
~

BRIEF AND ARGUMENT.

I.
THE ASSESSMENT PAID WHEN THE CERTIFICATE WAS DELIVERED FEBRUARY 18, 1922, WAS
FOR THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY, 1922, AND A NEW
ASSESSMENT BECAME PAYABLE FOR THE PERIOD
COMMENCING MARCH 1, 1922, AND FOR THE PERIOD COMMENCING ON THE FIRST DAY OF EACH
SUCCEEDING MONTH.
(a) Method of Operation of Fraternal Benefit Societies.

At the outset of this argument we wish to call the
Court's attention to the fact that the defendant is a fratenlal benefit society and not an old line insurance company. The universal practice of fraternal benefit societies is to levy monthly assessments, or as mentioned
iu Bacon on Life and Accident Insurance, Fourth Edition, page 33, ''In the societies the fund is obtained
hy periodical taxes upon the membership, at stated in1 <•1-vals, or as required, sufficient to meet the demand.''
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This Court, in the case of White v. W. 0. W., 87
Utah 477, 50 P. ( 2d) 422, had under consideration the
difference between fraternal benefit societies and old
line life insurance companies, and in the opinion referred to the distinction as defined by :Mr. Justice
Holmes of the United States Supreme Court:
"The nature of the relationship between the
deceased member and the defendant must be understood in order to have a clear notion of the law
applicable to the case. Such relationship is well expressed by lVIr. Justice Holmes in the case of Supreme Lodge, K. P. v. Mims, 241 U.S. 574, at page
580, 36 S. Ct. 702, 704, 60 L. Ed. 1179, L. R. A.
1916F, 919:
''Persons who join institutions of this sort are
not dealing at arm's length with a stranger whose
mode of providing for payment does not concern
them, but only his promise to pay. They are joining a club the members of which have to pay any
benefit that any member can receive. The corporation is simply the machine for collection and
distribution.''
The White case further discloses how fraternal benefit
societies are still operating on the assessment plan, and
when necessary may levy extra or multiple assessments,
and are not operating on the level premium plan. See
also Jenkins v. Talbot, 338 Ill. 441, 170 N. E. 735.
The contract in question shows clearly that the
member agreed to pay monthly assessments and not
merely life insurance premiums in payment for insurance for a specified period of time.
Section 103 of the By-laws of the Defendant (Abst.
49), a part of the contract, provides that every member
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is required to pay an assessm.ent each month. Section
48 provides that the National Executive Committee
shall le,·y extra or special assessments when necessary.
Section 112 provides that if the assessment is not paid
on or before the last day of the month, the member becomes suspended ( Abst. 49).
(b) Contract may fix premium due date prior to
anniversary of effective date of Policy.
~~t the outset of this case plaintiff made the contention that defendant did not have the legal right to
require subsequent premiums to be paid on a date other
than the anniversary of the effective date of the Certificate. However, plaintiff has apparently abandoned
this contention.

It is well established, with but very few exceptions,
that an insurance organization may fix the date for payment of premiums, although the policy does not go into
effect on a date corresponding to a date fixed for such
subsequent premiums. The rule is stated in 32 C. J.
Insurance, 1196, Sec. 329, as follows:

"Although there is authority to the contrary,
the general rule is that the fact that the policy does
not go into effect on a date corresponding to the
date fixed for payment of subsequent premiums,
does not change the provisions of the contract as
to when such subsequent premiums become payable."
The same rule is announced in 6 A. L. R. 775, as follows:
"When a policy, conditioned to take effect on
the payment of the first premium, expressly speciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fies the date from which the premium period is to
be computed, and makes that date the day all the
recurring premiums are due and payable, such date
must control, regardless of the date on which the
policy is delivered.''
There are complete annotations on this subject in 6
A. L. R. 774, 32 A. L. R. 1253, 80 A. L. R. 957, and 111
A. L. R. 1420. See also Wolford' Adm'x. v. National Life
Ins. Co., 114 Kan. 411, 219 P. 263. As this right is not
now seriously questioned by plaintiff, we will not prolong this brief by citing authorities on this question.
The above rule applies to fraternal contracts with
much more force than to old line contracts. In an old
line company the longer the applicant waits to pay his
first premium the shorter the period of protection he
receives in return for this premium. In a fraternal society the member may, if he desires, wait until the first
day of the next month to pay his first assess~ent and
by so doing will receive a full month's protection in
return for the monthly assessment in addition to a
month's grace period. The choice is left to the member.
Plaintiff stresses the point that an applicant whose
Certificate is not delivered until the last day of the
month would receive but one day's insurance in return
for his monthly assessment. This is not correct. She
would receive insurance protection for the entire month
which follows, by reason of the grace period contained
in the contract (Constitution and Laws, Sec. 103, 112,
Abst. 49, 50.) In Mrs. Fawcett's case, if she had never
paid another assessment after the first she still would
have received one month and ten day's insurance protection in return for one monthly assessment.
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(c) The Contract provides for payments for each
calendar month.

Plaintiff and defendant agree that the main question inYolved is, .. \Yhat does the contract provide 1"
Plaintiff claims that the Certificate and By-laws taken
together provided that the first payment paid for insurance from the 18th day of February to the 17th day
of l\tlarch; that the next payment paid for insurance
from the 18th day of ~larch to the 17th day of April,
etc. Defendant contends that the assessment paid when
the Certificate was delivered was the assessment ''for
the month in which the Certificate is delivered" as required by Section 103 of the By-laws (Exhibit 3, Abst.
49); that the next assessment "became due and payable
on the first day of the month'' ( lVIarch), but the member
was permitted to pay such assessment and dues ''on or
before the last day of the month,'' as provided in Section 112 of the By-laws (Abst. 49, 50), and as provided
in the Certificate which requires payment of $2.35 ''to
be paid within each month to the Financier of the Local
Council;'' that the last assessment paid to September
30, 1928, and that the extended protection of 10 years
and thirty days expired October 30, 1938.
An examination of the contract will disclose that
there is no ambiguity and no inconsistency; that the entire contract is in accordance with defendant's contention that each monthly assessment became payable on
the first day of each succeeding month and had to be
paid on or before the last day of the month. The Certificate itself provides as follows (Abst. 42):
''In consideration of the statements, answers
and agreements in the application of the member,
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which by this contract are made warranties, and in
further consideration of the first monthly contribution of $2.35 paid before or at the time of the delivery of this Certificate, and thereafter $2.35 to
be paid within each month to the Financier of the
Local Council, for a completed period of twenty
years from the date of the first payment thereon:''
(Italics ours.)
When the Certificate of Harriett P. Fawcett was
delivered, she was required to pay one assessment and
Local Council dues "for the month in which the Certificate was delivered" (February, 1922), and "thereafter on or before the last day of each succeeding month"
she was required, without notice, to pay the sum of one
assessment and the local dues to the Financier. (Ex. 3,
Sec. 103, Abst. 49)
Therefore the assessment and dues for the month
of March became due and payable on the first day of
March, but the member was permitted to pay such
assessment and dues on or before the last day of the
month (Ex. 3, Sec. 112, Abst. 49.)
Plaintiff contends that the term "first day of the
month" as used in the By-laws, does not mean first day
of the month, but on the contrary means the 18th day
of the month, and that the term "last day of the
month" as used in the By-laws, means the 17th day of
the following month, and also contends that the term
"within each month" as used in the Certificate, means
any time between the 18th day of one month and the
17th day of the following month.
Plaintiff in his complaint was unable to find any
language designating the day on which assessments became due, which was more appropriate than that used
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by defendant in the contract. lie uses the same language as that contained in the contract, but changes the
date. The eoutract provides "all a~sessments for every
month shall became due and payable on the first day of
the rnonth" (Ex. 3, Sec. 112, pages 57, 58, Abst. 49.)
Plaintiff alleges (Abst. 5) "that each payment thereafter fell due on the 18th day of each month." It is difficult to understand how anyone could claim that the
term ''on the first day of the month,'' as used in Section 112 of Defendant's By-laws, means "on the 18th
day of each month'' as alleged by plaintiff in his complaint. Defendant's interpretation is consistent with the
language used in the contract. Plaintiff's interpretation
changes the language of the contract.
When the term "first day of the month" is used,
whether it is in a contract, a journal entry, lease, or any
other instrument, it means but one thing, which fact is
universally understood. This term is probably used more
often than almost any other legal term. Leases provide
that rent shall be payable on a certain day of the month.
Journal Entries provide that alimony shall be paid on a
certain day of the month. Yet the meaning of such terms
is never questioned, because they are as clear as the
English language can make them.
There are several cases in the United States which
interpret the term ''first day of each month,'' ''monthly
premiums,'' and similar language.
In the case of Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v. Rhyne, 171
Miss 687, 158 So. 472, a notice attached to the policy
provided that assessments should be paid on or before
the first day of each month. The Court interpreted this
as meaning on or before March 1, 1933. This, although
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the Certificate itself was not dated until February 6,
1924.
The case of Craig v. Golden· Rule Life Ins. Co.,
184 Ark. 48, · 41 S. W. (2d) 769, is quite similar
to the instant case. In this case the policy was delivered
October 10, 1929, and provided that subsequent payments should be due ''on or before the first day of each
month during the current calendar year, and monthly
in advance thereafter . . . '' The policy further provided for a grace period of twenty days. The insured
failed to pay the premium due June 1st on or before
June 20th, and was killed June 29th. The Court in the
opinion stated:
"It is insisted for appellants that, October
lOth being the day the policy was delivered and received by the insured,. it thereafter fixed the lOth
day of each succeeding month as the due date of
the premium thereon, and, the insured being entitled to . 20 days' grace on the payment of premiums, the policy was in force on June 29; 1930,
when the insured was killed.
The meaning of the contract is clear and unambiguous, and its terms were well understood and
recognized by the insured and the insurer. The
application made on September 28, 1929, recited
that the second premium would be due on November 1, 1929; the policy was dated October 9,. 1929,
the day it was mailed to the insured, and recited
that it was granted in consideration of the application and the payment of 85 cents on or before
the 1st day of October, 1929, and a like payment on
or before the 1st of each month during the calendar
year and monthly payments in advance thereafter,
increasing annually on January 1st of each year in
accordance with the cash savings step rate plan."
(Italics ours.)
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Here again the language '• on or before the first of
eaeh month" is interpreted in accordance with Defendant's eontention, and the Court held that this lang·uage is ''clear and unambiguous.''
In the case of ...lloran v. Knights of Columbus, 46
Utah 397, 151 Pac. 353, the By-laws provided for forfeiture of membership where the member failed to pay
his assessment ''within thirty days from the first day
of the month in which levied." This Court also took for
granted that the By-laws meant what they said and that
the "first day of the month" did not mean the lOth,
18th or 25th day of the month. Although the opinion
does not state, an examination. of the record in that case
will undoubtedly disclose that the certificate was delivered on a date later than the first of the month.
In the case of Kennedy v. M. W. A., 92 Utah 487,
69 P. (2d) 508, the certificate, according to the opinion,
was issued August 24, 1928, but this Court stated in the
course of the opinion that Kennedy paid his dues and
premiums for a period of 34 months but stopped payment of premiums and his policy lapsed and became
void for non-payment of premiums July 1, 1931 (including one month's grace period,) and he lost his membership standing in the Order. The 34 monthly premiums·
paid from August, 1928, to :May, 1931, both months inclusive, yet the Certificate was not issued until August·
24, 1928.
Hundreds of cases can be cited in which the Courts
have decided without question that the contracts, using
almost identical language as that used by defendant in
this case, became void at midnight of the last day of
the calendar month. It is significant that in the hunSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dreds or even thousands of cases interpreting fraternal
contracts, that no one, up to this time, with possibly one
exception, has seen fit to even contend that the terms
''first day of the month,'' ''during the month,'' etc.,
meant anything other than a month as fixed by the calendar, although in many cases a decision so holding would
enable their clients to recover.
As stated above, an examination of the contract as
a whole will disclose that the terms ''first day of the
month," "last day of the month," "within each
month,'' etc., were intended to mean and were understood by the insured to mean but one thing, and that is
the first day of each month as fixed by the calendar.
In addition to the Sections of the Constitution and
Laws hereinbefore referred to, they contain other references to certain days in the month. Section 159 ( Abst.
50, 51) provides that the Financier shall on or before
the 5th day of each month make a full and complete
report of all assessments paid for or by each member
of the Subordinate Council for the preceding month,
and shall forward the same with remittance not later
than the 15th day of the month (Italics ours.) It will be
noted that this report is made of payments by members
"for the preceding month." If plaintiff's interpretation of the contract were adopted and each member's
monthly payment covered a different period of time, it
would be impossible to determine what is meant by the
term "the prceeding month." It is only when defendant's interpretation is adopted that this Section of
the By-laws has any meaning. Furthermore it· is apparent that the Financier is to make only one report,
and that report is to be made on the 5th day of each
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month. The remittance is to be made not later than the
15th day of the month. We do not believe even plaintiff would contend that this term, as used in Section
159, is ambiguous, yet it is used in the same contract
and uses the same lang·uage as that contained in Sections 103 and 112.
Plaintiff in the Trial Court contended, however,
that the use in the Certificate of the term "first
monthly contribution" means that the first contribution paid for a full month's insurance. Nearly all assessinents levied against fraternal certificate holders
are monthly assessments, although occasionally assessments are levied quarterly. The term "first monthly
assessment" is explained in Section 103 of the By-laws
(Abst. 49.) It is the assessment and Local Council dues ·
"for the month in which the Certificate is delivered."
In Shira v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 90 Fed. (2d) 953, the
insurance policy was dated January 7, 1930, and was
delivered to the insured January 16, 1930, on which date
the insured paid the first quarterly premium. Subsequent quarterly premiums, by the terms of the policy,
became due on April 2, 1930, and a like sum on said date
every three calendar months thereafter during the life
of the insured. The Court held that it was consistent
for parties to a life insurance contract to make such
stipulations with reference to the effective date of the
policy, the period which the initial payment shall cover,
and the times when the future premiums shall become
due, and such stipulations are binding on the parties,
and further held that the extended insurance ran from
the date the premium fell due. Here the term "quarterly
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premium'' was similar to the term ''monthly contribution'' used in the instant case.
In the case of Frysh v. Commercial Casttalty Ins.
Co., 214 Wis. 453, 253 N. W. 184, the policy provided
that, "In consideration of the policy fee of Two and
N o/100 Dollars and the monthly premium of Two and
30/100 Dollars" (Italics ours), the insurance was carried to May 1st, ''and for such time thereafter as the
premiums paid by the insured, as herein agreed, shall
maintain this policy in force." The policy became effective April 15, 1931. The deceased made two other
monthly payments. It was Defendant's contention that
the first of the monthly payments kept the policy in
force from April 15th to May 1st, and that the other
two carried the policy to July 1st. Plaintiff's contention is that l\fike Frysh paid $2.00 for a policy fee and
three monthly premiums amounting to $6.90, and that
the policy having gone into effect on April 15th the
three monthly premiums should carry the policy to
July 15th. The Court, in sustaining defendant's contention, said:
''Insofar as the policy is corrected, it is unahbiguous and this conclusion is inescapable. There
is no room for construction." (Italics ours.)
This, although the policy referred to the premium as
"monthly premiums," similar to the language "monthly
contributions'' as used in defendant's contract in the
instant case. The Court further stated:
"It seems to us not unreasonable that an insurance company should desire to have its premium
payments operate on the insurance as of the first
of the month.''
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Plaintiff in the Trial Court contended that to give
the Certificate the construction contended for by Defendant results in one of three conclusions: either that
the first contribution was for term insurance from the
date of payment to March 1, 1922, or that it covered a
period from February 1, 1922, to March 1, 1922, or that
it was not a full month's contribution. As to the first
contention, we will say definitely that this was not term
insurance. As to the second contention, the assessment
was for "the month in which the Certificate was delivered,'' or the month of February, 1922, although the
applicant did not become a member until February 18th.
The answer to the second contention also answers the
third. The assessment was a monthly assessment.
Plaintiff's final contention is that the construction
placed upon the above language by defendant requires
241 monthly payments to be made on a Twenty Pay Life
Certificate. The language of the Certificate is as follows:
"In consideration of the statements, answers
and agreements in the application of the member,
which by this contract are made warranties, and in
further consideration of the first monthly contribution of $2.35 paid before or at the time of the
delivery of this Certificate, and thereafter $2.35
to be paid within each month to the Financier of
the Local Council, for a completed period of twenty
years from the date of -the first payment thereon:"
This clause is not in issue in this lawsuit, for the reason
that the member at no time made payments for the full
period of twenty years. If the question should ever
arise as to whether or not the member was required to
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tificate, then the question of the correct interpretation
of this clause might become important. However, this
clause contained in the Certificate is not inconsistent
with Defendant's contention. According to Defendant's
interpretation, "within each month" would mean on or
before the 30th or 31st day of each calendar month.
According to Plaintiff's interpretation the term "within
each month" means on or before the 17th day of each
succeeding calendar month. Under neither interpretation is a two hundred forty-first payment required to be
paid until after the expiration of the "completed period
of twenty years from the date of the first payment
thereon.'' Similar language has been under consideration by the Courts and has been given the construction
contended for by defendant. In the case of Minnesota
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 29 F. (2d) 977, 979, in
which the question of when a life insurance premium
became due was involved, the Court made the following
remark:
"An obligation is due during the entire period
during which it may be paid, whether that period
extends over one day, three days, or thirty days.
The premium was not really due, in the sense that
the failure to pay it would result in a forfeiture of
the policy, until the grace period had expired.''
Using the same language in the instant case, a 241st
premium was not due, in the sense that the failure to
pay it would result in the forfeiture of the policy, until
after the maturity of the policy.
It is necessary to use the language ''twenty years
from the date of the first payment thereon" for the reason that the applicant had sixty days after the date of
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issuance of his Certificate within which to pay the first
a~8essment. (Section 96 Constitution and Laws. Abst.
-iS) ln the instant case if _Mr~. 11--,a,n.·ett had not paid her
first assessment until the 14th of April, her Certificate
would not have become paid up until the 14th of April,
1942, thus requiring 240 payments. Twenty years from
the date of issuance would have required but 238 payments. However, as stated above, this provision of the
contract is not in question in the instant case, but was
raised solely in au attempt to inject some ambiguity into
an unambiguous contract.
Plaintiff's Attorneys in the trial court cited but
two cases which, they claim, tend to sustain their contention. The first is the case of Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v.
Reed, 94 S. 910 (Ala.) The second is Rybczynski v. Chicago Fraternal Life Assurance Co., 277 N. Y. S. 366.
We believe the case of Rybczynski v. Chicago Fraternal Life Assurance Co., 227 N. Y. S. 366, tends to
sustain Defendant's rather than Plaintiff's contention.
The contract stated that payment would be due on the
first day of the calendar month of the quarterly period.
A prior Certificate, which was not accepted, was issued
January 27, 1926. The Certificate which was accepted
was dated February 3, 1926. The Court held that the
provision that the payments were due on the first day
of the calendar month and must be paid on or before
the last day of the month indicated that payments
should be made during the month of February, 1927.
The only definite holding in the Rybczynski case on this
point was that the member had the remainder of the
month of February, 1927, in which to make payment.
The Court nowhere held that he had to and including
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March 2nd. As stated above this holding tends to sustain Defendant's contention rather than that of plaintiff.
As to the Reed case, 94 S. 910 (Ala.), the member
paid the December payment on December 31, 1919, and
paid two subsequent payments, and in addition had a
grace period of one month. Clearly the Certificate was
in force under any possible theory on the 25th day of
February, 1920. The .Court, although it was not necessary, in rendering a decision for. the Plaintiff, interpreted the term "monthly premium" as meaning the
calendar month to follow, not the calendar month which
expired on the day the monthly premium was paid.
Whether it was for the month of December, 1919, or
January, 1920, is immaterial, because the assessments
paid continued the Certificate in force to and within the
month of March, 1920.
It is apparent from an examination of the cases
cited by the Alabama Court in support of its dicta defining the term "month," that the Court failed to analyze the cases upon which it relied. All of the cases cited
interpreted the term calendar ''month'' as used in contracts and statutes as distinguished from a lunar month.
At common law the term "month" meant a lunar month.
It was necessary by Statute in most states to provide
that the term "month" meant a calendar month. (See
Rev. St. Utah 1933, Sec. 82-2-12 (1); G. S. Kan. 1935, Sec.
77 .,.201 ( 11).) In the case of Warfield Nat ural Gas Co. v.
Clark, 257 Ky. 724, 79 S. W. (2d) 21, 97 A. L. R. 971, the
Court carefully considered the Reed case and all other
decided cases on the point, and made the following logical analysis :
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"On the second proposition [that the word
'month' a~ used in the contract between the parties
denotes the period between a day of a calendar
month and the corresponding day ~f the succeeding
calendar month], there seems to be a confusion of
authority with no cases cited that are directly in
point. In 5 \Y ords and Phrases, First Series, p.
467 4, it is said : "At common law the word 'month'
when used without qualification, meant a lunar
month, or twenty-eight days. [Citing authorities.]
. . . Which rule was abolished by statute in F~ng
land in 1850. [Citing authorities.] In the United
States the common-law rule was followed in some
of the earlier cases. [Citing authorities.] But the
holdings now seem to be uniform that the word, in
whatever connection it is used, signifies a calendar
month unless a contrary intent is indicated, and in
many states this rule has been fixed by statute.
[Citing authorities, including Pyle v. Maulding, 30
Ky. (17 J. J. Marsh.) 202; Hardin v. Major, 7 Ky.
(4 Bibb) 104, 105; Hopkins v. Chambers, 23 Ky.
(7 T. B. Mon.) 257, 262]."
"In the case of McGinn v. State, 46 Neb. 427,
65 N. W. 46, 47, 30 L. R. A. 450, 50 Am. St. Rep.
617, cited by counsel for appellant, it is said: "The
term 'calendar month,' whether employed in statutes or contracts, and not appearing to have been
used in a different sense, denotes a period terminating with the day of the succeeding month numerically corresponding to the day of its beginning,
less one. If there be no corresponding day of the
succeeding month, it terminates with the last day
thereof.''
"The case of Daley v. Anderson, 7 Wyo. 1, 48
P. 839, 75 Am. St. Rep. 870, cited by counsel for
appellant, is to the same effect. See also, State v.
White, 73 Fla. 426, 74 So. 486; Page v. O'Sullivan,
159 Ky. 703, 169 S. W. 542. In the long list of cases
cited and in Words and Phrases, supra, and in
many other caRes not cited, it is held that the word
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''month'' as used in statutes, eontracts, etc., means
a calendar month as disting·uished from the lunar
month, unless the contrary is expressed. But the
controversy between counsel here is whether the
term ''calendar month'' means only a month as
delimited by the calendar or may also mean a period beginning on a day in one calendar month and
running to a corresponding day in the succeeding
month. Counsel for appellee of course held to the
former view and cite 62 C. J. 969; 26 R. C. L. 732;
Sovereign Camp W. 0. W., v. Reed, 208 Ala. 457,
94 So. 910; Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co. v. Southern Refining Co., 158 Cal. 264, 110 P. 951, 953; Ky.
Stat. Sec. '452, and subdivision 25 of section 732 of
the Civil Code of Practice. The section of the statute cited is in a chapter relating to the construction of statutes, and the section of the Code cited
relates to the construction of provisions of the
Code. The case of Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co. v.
Southern Refining Co. is more directly in point
than any of the other authorities cited. In that case
two contracts had been made. One made January
3, 1906, was for the sale of 4,000 tons of asphalt to
be delivered within one year from January 1, the
delivery to be made as rapidly as possible, provided that not more than 400 tons were to be called
for in any one month. Payments were to be made
on the lOth day of each month for all material delivered during the preceding month. The second
contract was made on ~fay 6, 1906, and is identical
in language with the first, except as to date, and
the time in which the asphalt was to be t~ken,
which was one year from May 16, 1906, and further
that the asphalt furnished under the contract was
to be in addition to the amount to be furnished
under the former contract. In summing up the eonelusion as to the construction to be given the terms
of the contract, it was said: "We think the proper
construction of the contract of May 16th is that by
the 'one month,' therein referred to, a calendar
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month was intended and understood. This is shown
by the clause immediately following, to the effect
that payments 'll'ere to ue made on the 10th of each
maJllh for all the a~phnlt delivered during the preceding month. EYidently both of these kindred provisions refer to the months of the rnlendar." (Italics ours.)
"In Derby v. Dancey, 112 La. 891, 36 So. 795,
796, it is said: ''A month is a definite period of
time, commencing on the 1st day thereof, and ending on the 28th, 29th, 30th, or 31st day."
''From an exhaustive research of authorities,
in addition to those cited by counsel for the respective parties, we have been unable to find any
fixed rules for determining the meaning of the
word "month" as used in contracts, aiid the failure
to find such a rule is not disappointing, since it is
apparent at first blush that the meaning of the
term, like many others used in contracts, must be
determined from the particular sense in which it is
used. Where there is doubt or ambiguity in the
language of a contract, courts will resort to established rules of construction in determining its
meaning. As will be seen from the quoted provisions of the contract, the amount payable for gas
furnished during each month shall be due on the
1st day of the following month, and unless paid on
or before the 15th of each month, the gas will be
shut off without further notice.
"In Webster's New International Dictionary,
the words ''calendar month'' are defined as '' ( 1)
any of the months as adjusted in the calendar, now
the Gregorian. April, June, September, and N ovember now contain 30 days, and the rest 31, except
February, which has 28, and in leap years, 29. (2)
The time from any day of such a month to the corresponding day (if any; if not, to the last day) of
the next month.''
''Standing alone, the quoted excerpt from the
rules and regulations on the reverse side of the
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application would clearly indicate that the word
''month'' was used in the sense as first defined in
the dictionary, and this construction should be
adopted unless the instrument as a whole indicates
that it was used in the other sense, or unless it
should be made to appear that, by their course of
dealing under the contract, the parties themselves
put the latter construction upon it. When considered as a whole, there is nothing in tbe contract to
indicate that the term was used other than in the
sense of a month as adjusted or delimited by the
calendar, nor is there any proof as to the conduct
or dealings of the parties under it to warrant a
conclusion that they gave it any other construction. The use of the kindred terms "each month,"
"on the first day of the following month," and the
"5th of each month," as said in Fairchild-Gilmore-Wilton Co. v. Southern Refining Co., supra,
indicates not only a "calendar month" but "a
month of the calendar" was meant and understood."
(Italics ours.)
We believe the conclusion is inescapable that the contract issued by Defendant to Harriett P. Fawcett was
clear and unambiguous; that the terms "the first day of
each month," "within each month," "assessment for the
month in which the Certificate is delivered" and "on or
before the last day of each succeeding month'' are perfectly clear, and that the Certificate of Harriett P. Fawcett, as extended, became null and void on October 30,
1938.
(d) The construction placed upon the contract by
the parties thereto is controlling.

It is universally recognized that the intention of the
parties to a contract is the controlling element to be con-
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sidered. This rule is well
ance, page 346, a8 follo~ws:

~tated 111

1 Couch on Insur-

''The rule of interpretation of insurance contracts, and the first object of construction, is to
ascertain the intention· or meaning of the parties,
and the duty of the courts is to construe the contract accordingly.''
Couch further announces the rule for ascertaining the
intention of the parties as follows: (P. 351)
"However, the meaning of an insurance contract may be measured by the conduct of all the
parties thereto, if the terms of the contract, when
reasonably construed, are in harmony with that
conduct, since, where the parties have themselves
placed a construction on certain provisions of the
contract, and the same is neither in conflict with
any language therein, nor violative of statute, reg·ulation, or public policy, the courts will adopt such
construction. And when the parties to an ambiguous insurance contract, by their own acts, place a
construction upon it, that construction is the best
evidence of what the contract was actually intended
to mean." (Italics ours.)
In the case of Scotten v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
336 Mo. 724, 81 S. W. (2d) 313, the Court held that although the policy was ambiguous as to whether the
premiums were due on the anniversary of the date of
the policy or on the anniversary of its delivery, this
required a construction of the policy as it was understood and acted upon by the insured and the insurer.
The Court held :
"It is a well established rule of law that the
construction placed upon a contract by the parties,
as evidenced by their acts, conduct or declarations
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indicating a mutual intent and understanding, will
be adopted by the Courts where the language of
the contract is ambiguous, or there is reasonable
doubt as to its meaning, but not where it is plain
and unambiguous.''
There is no evidence whatever that Harriett P.
Fawcett did not understand the contract in question as
requiring payments to be made during the month of
March, 1922, and during each calendar month thereafter. The Agreed Statement of ·Facts discloses that
she made her final payment on September 30, 1928,
which was the final date for making that monthly payment, according to Defendant's theory. While this evidence is slight, it indicates that Mrs. Fawcett followed
the all too human habit of waiting until the last day to
make her payments. Outside of this, the only evidence
as to the understanding of the parties is the rider attached to the Certificate. This rider is clear, unambiguous and not open to construction. If this rider is
held not to be a new contract, it still should be given
the greatest weight in determining the intention of the
parties. The rider expresses the interprtation as understood by Defendant, it expresses the interpretation of
the contract as practiced by all fraternal societies and
other assessment insurance organizations, and expresses
the interpretation of the contract as accepted by the
Courts without question in thousands of reported cases,
and unquestionably expresses the interpretation of the
insured Harriett P. Fawcett. We wish to set out the
language of the rider in full in this Brief for the consideration of the Court. The endorsement provides as
follows:
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''January 18, 1929.
The Security Benefit Association, upon the request of the said Harriett P. Fawcett, hereby
waives the periodical contributions stipulated in
this Certificate of membership and continues Whole
Life Protection for death benefits only, in the sum
of $1000.00 for ten years and thirty days from
October 1, 1928, this Certificate of membership expiring Octo her 30, 1938.
As part of the consideration for this extension
the said Harriett Fawcett agrees to surrender this
Certificate for cancellation after the expiration
thereof as above described.
THE SECURITY BENEFIT ASSN.
J. M. Kirkpatrick,
National President.
J. V. Abrahams,
(Seal)
National Secretary.''
It will be noted that in two different places the
rider is specific as to the period covered. It states that
the insured is entitled to death benefits only in the sum
of $1000.00 ''for ten years and thirty days from October 1, 1928." Again it states, "this Certificate of mem-·
bership expiring October 30, 1938.'' Certainly there is
nothing ambiguous about this rider. It was received
and retained by Harriett P. Fawcett for over ten years
without objection.
The rule is well stated in 32 Corpus Juris, Insurance, page 1129, Sec. 233, as follows:

"In the absence of fraud, the unconditional
delivery of a policy corresponding with the terms
of the application consummates the contract. By
the delivery of the policy to insured he is put on
notice of the conditions therein expressed. Also, in
the absence of fraud or mistake, a policy of insurance, on acceptance thereof, becomes a valid and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

binding contract; it is the final contract between
the parties, superseding all preliminary agreements
and negotiations; it is conclusive as to the engagements of both parties in respect to the obligations
declared in it; insured is bound by, and is conclusively presumed to have knowledge of, and to
have assented to, all the terms, conditions, limitations, or other provisions or recitals, in the policy,
including statements in the application where it is
expressly made a part of the policy."
Corpus Juris further states the rule on page 1139 as
follows: (Sec. 246)
''Likewise by accepting and retaining the
policy or other final written contract of insurance
for a considerable period of time, without objection, he waives any departure in the contents of
the policy or contract from the application, preliminary agreement, or other prior instrument, and
is estopped and precluded from asserting that it
is not his contract. Ordinarily failure of insured
to read or examine the policy is such negligence as
estops him from asserting that it is not his contract. . . . "
This endorsement is the strongest evidence of the
interpretation of the contract in question. The rider
was short, plain and unambiguous. The presumption is
that Harriett P. Fawcett read it and by accepting and
retaining it for a period of over ten years she certainly
led Defendant to believe that this was her understanding of the contract. Unquestionably this rider did express her interpretation of the contract, as it expressed
the construction placed thereon by Defendant. There is
absolutely no evidence to the contrary. This is the
strongest evidence of the correct construction of the
contract.
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II.
THE ENDORSEMENT ON THE CERTIFICATE CONSTITUTED A NEW CONTRACT.

The endorsement placed upon the Certificate of
Harriett P. Fawcett, together with the surrounding circumstances, disclose clearly that a new contract was
consummated at that time. l\Irs. Fawcett agreed in her
application for change to extended protection, of date
January 6, 1929, that the extended Beneficiary Certiticate should be in substitution and revocation of all
rights and interests to which she might have been entitled under said Beneficiary Certificate before change.
(Abst. 52) The endorsement placed upon the Certificate
refers to the Certificate, but limits the terms thereof. It
requires no citation of authorities to prove that a new
contract need not in itself contain all the provisions, but
may refer to a superseded contract for the remainder of
the terms. An example is an extension agreement, which
of itself does not contain all the terms· set forth in an
original mortgage, but which refers to the original
mortgage and changes some of its terms.
On January 6, 1929, Harriett P. Fawcett did not
have the right under her original contract, to extended
insurance. The original Certificate provides that the
member shall have the option to obtain extended insurance "provided the member has made the stipulated
periodical contributions without default for not less
than three years prior to the application for this privilege, and has maintained his status as a member as
required and prescribed in the Constitution and Laws
of the Association." (Abst. 44.) Harriett P. Faw'eett
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had not complied with this requirement and therefore
was not entitled to extended insurance as a matter of
right under Option VI of her contract. The Agreed
Statement of Facts shows that the last payment made
by Harriett P. Fawcett was on September 30, 1928,
which payment was for the month of September (Abst.
26.) At the time she made application for extended insurance she was in default in the payment of the October, November and December, 1928, payments. The
terms contained in this option are similar to those under
consideration in the ca~e of Kennedy v. M. W. A., 92
Utah 487, 69 P. (2d) 508, in which the Court held that
the member must be in good standing in order to have
a contract right to extended insurance.
Plaintiff contended and the Trial Court found that
the endorsement had no force or effect, and that Mrs.
Fawcett's right to extended insurance was in effect by
virtue of the provisions for extended insurance contained in the original Certificate·. This ruling obviously
was error.
III.
PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED TO CLAIM THE CONTRACT DID NOT TERMINATE OCTOBER 30,
1938.

Plaintiff, of course, as beneficiary of Harriett P.
Fawcett, has only the rights that she would have had
under the contract. It is evident that Mrs. Fawcett,
after accepting and retaining the endorsement for over
ten years without objection, would be estopped to claim
that it did not correctly state the understanding of the
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partie~.

The correct rule of law, as stated in 3~ Corpus
Juris, page 1139, is herein a hove quoted, and provides
that a party, by accepting· and retaining a written contract for a considerable period of time without objection, is estopped and precluded from asserting that it
is not his contract. This rule is universal and requires
no further authorities.
IV.
UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE
LAWS OF KANSAS CONTROL THE RIGHTS OF
ALL MEMBERS OF DEFENDANT ASSOCIATION.

In Defendant's Answer, it pleaded its right under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution to have the rights and obligations of all
members interpreted under the Laws of Kansas. The
Supreme Court of the United States has on numerous
occasions sustained this right. (See Supreme Council,
Royal Arcanum v. Green, 35 S. Ct. 724, 237 U. S. 531;
M. W. A. v. Mixer, 45 S. Ct. 389, 267 U. S. 544.) The
latest decision of the United States Supreme Court on
this question was in the case of Sov. Camp W. 0. W. v.
Bolin, 305 U. S. 66, 59 S. Ct. 35, decided November 7,
1938, in which Mr. Justice Roberts paraphrased Mr.
Justice Holmes' language in the Mixer case as follows:
''First. The beneficiary certificate was not a
mere contract to be construed and enforced according to the laws of the state where it was delivered.
Entry into membership of an incorporated beneficiary society is more than a contract; it is entering into a complex and abiding relation and the
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rights of membership are governed by the law of
the state of incorporation. Another state, wherein
the certificate of membership was issued, cannot
attach to membership rights against the society
which are refused by the law of the domicile.''
This Court, in the case of White v. W. 0. W., 87
Utah 477, 50 P. (2d) 422, has recognized and followed
the rule as announced by the United States Supreme
Court. We quote from the opinion:
''Decision of Supreme Court of domicile of
fraternal benefit association held decisive on question of association's power to levy multiple assessments against holders of death benefit certificates."
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in the case of Wolford,
Administratrix, v. National Life Ins. Co., 114 Kan. 411,
219 P. 263, pleaded in Defendant's Answer, held as
follows:
''A policy of life insurance specifically provided for the annual payment of premiums after
the first on the anniversaries of the date of the
policy, with a grace period of one month, and that
a failure to pay any premium when due should forfeit the rights of the insured and terminate the
obligations of the insurance company under the
policy. The ·policy was not delivered to the insured
until 22 days after its date. Held, that the fact that
the policy was not delivered on its date or a date
corresponding with the times specifically fixed for
the payments of subsequent premiums did not postpone the time for such payments to the anniversary
of the date of delivery." (Syl.)
Although, as heretofore stated in this Brief, apparently plaintiff does not now question the right of
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defendant to require subsequent premiums to be paid
on a date prior to the anniversary of the policy, defendant still insists upon it~ constitutional right to
have the rights of its member~ interpreted in accordance
with the Law of Kansas.
CONCLUSION.

From the above we believe the conclusion is inescapable that the evidence clearly shows:
1. That the first assessment paid when the Certificate was delivered was the monthly assessment for the
month in which the Certificate was delivered; that the
next assessment was for the month of March, 1922, although the member had as days of grace until midnight
of the last day of March in which to pay said assessment; that each subsequent assessment was for the period commencing on the first day of each month as
designated by the calendar; that the last assessment
was for the month of September, 1928; that the extended insurance of ten years and thirty days commenced to run October 1, 1928, and terminated October
30, 1938; that this was the understanding of the parties
to the contract, as is evidenced by the fact that the
member had in her possession for over ten years an
endorsement so providing and at no time made any complaint or objection thereto; that the endorsement placed
upon the Certificate Jannary 18, 1929, was, as provided
in the application therefor, "in substitution and revocation of all rights and interest to which [she] may have
been entitled under the said Beneficiary Certificate before change."
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2. That the member's rights and the rights of
plaintiff as her beneficiary are fixed and determined by
said endorsement.
3. That plaintiff, as beneficiary of Harriett P.
Fawcett, is estopped to claim any rights inconsistent
with the terms of the endorsement, and
4. That under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of
the United States Constitution the rights of all members, including Harriett P. Fawcett, and of plaintiff
as her beneficiary, must be determined under the Laws
of Kansas, and that under such Laws the act of defendant in requiring assessments after the first to be
paid on a date prior to the anniversary of the delivery
of the Certificate was legal and valid.
From the above the defendant respectfully contends
that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed
and judgment rendered herein for the appellant, or that
the cause be remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
A. c. MELVILLE,
A. w. FULTON,
HARRY L. LADBURY,

Attorneys for Appellant.
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